Tax morale,fiscal capacity,and war

This paper studies the effects of mobilization for war on the development of fiscal capacity and the values of tax compliance (tax morale). We propose a dynamic setting where governments may invest resources to improve the efficiency of the fiscal apparatus and the citizens' tax morality in order to raise the necessary revenues for the defense against a threat (external or internal), and parents optimally choose to transmit their preferences of tax compliance to children. Despite fiscal capacity and tax morale are initially substitutes, we show how a dynamic complementarity may arise in equilibrium from a more efficient transmission of the values of tax compliance in countries with high fiscal capacity, and this may explain why they tend to move together over time. Under reasonable conditions, we obtain that the effect of a higher threat of war on the steady-state level of the culture of tax compliance is negative when fiscal capacity is relatively low, and positive when the latter is large. We show cross-country evidence based on war frequency, fiscal capacity, and tax morale that is consistent with the results of our theory.     

Optimal pricing and investment for resources with alternative uses and capacity limits

Airport runways, radio spectrum, and hospital beds are resources with capacity limits used to provide multiple services with specific capacity requirements in separate markets, which contribute to recover capacity investment costs. A welfare-maximizing and (possibly) budget-constrained firm, whose operating costs significantly increase as total capacity use presses against capacity, chooses prices and capacity. When the equilibrium capacity is reached, second-best Ramsey prices must be adjusted, and mark-ups on marginal costs may be higher for services with higher demand elasticities, if they intensively use capacity. Moreover, for a given output vector, the firm invests more than in first best. Instead, the equilibrium capacity may be first best when there is excess capacity to reduce operating costs and thus improve welfare. Our model can be used as a benchmark to evaluate the efficiency of market mechanisms for resource allocation and pricing, or when market mechanisms are not adopted.

     

Calibration to FX triangles of the 4/2 model under the benchmark approach

Decisions in Economics and Finance - We calibrate a novel multifactor stochastic volatility model that includes as special cases the Heston-based model of De Col et al. (J Bank Finance...     

THE POWER OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE CHAIR

This article examines the influence exerted by the Federal Reserve chair on monetary policy decisions. We construct a voting model where the chair selects the proposal that is initially put to a vote but is subject to an acceptance constraint that incorporates the preferences of the median Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) member and the probability of counterproposals. The model is estimated by maximum likelihood using real-time data from FOMC meetings. Results for all chairs in our sample show that the chair's proposal is the result of a compromise, reflecting a stable balance of power within the FOMC.     

A fuzzy-hybrid analysis of citizens’ perception toward immigrants in Europe

Quality & Quantity - The public and political debate about immigration now play a big role in all European elections, and there is a trend increasing an anti-immigrant sentiment that receives...     

Closed-loop Nash competition for liquidity

We study a multiplayer stochastic differential game, where agents interact through their joint price impact on an asset that they trade to exploit a common trading signal. In this context, we prove that a closed-loop Nash equilibrium exists if the price impact parameter is small enough. Compared to the corresponding open-loop Nash equilibrium, both the agents' optimal trading rates and their performance move towards the central-planner solution, in that excessive trading due to lack of coordination is reduced. However, the size of this effect is modest for plausible parameter values.